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ABSTRACT 
 the present study seeks to examine the Relationship independent directors, ownership concentration, 
institutional ownership, auditor type and free floating shares with firm value  in companies listed at Tehran Stock 
Exchange. Independent variables used in this study are consisted of the comprises  independent directors, 
ownership concentration, institutional ownership, auditor type and free floating shares.Corporate value is our 
dependent variable measured by Tobin-Q index. Also,control variables such as firm size, leverage, and growth 
opportunity are used. The study is an applied research with correlative, post-event methodology. Population of 
the study includes 200 companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange during 2006 to 2014 using screening method. 
Normal least squares regression model is used for testing hypotheses. The research results show that in 
Throughout the entire Companies, Concentration of ownership and institutional ownership Positive and 
significant correlations and Free floating shares Negative and significant correlations have with firm vlue and 
independent directors and auditor type No correlation with the with firm vlue. 
Key words:  independent directors, ownership concentration, institutional ownership, auditor type , free floating 
shares , firm value   
 
 1.Introduction 
 Emergence of big enterprises, followed by the matter of separating ownership from management with all its 
pleasant and unpleasant consequences, was a great source of concern in late 19thand early 20thcenturies. 
However, corporate governance in its present form first appeared in 1990s in Britain, the U.S and Canada as a 
response to problems arising from efficiency of board of directors in big companies. Financial crisis in the recent 
years made prominent the issue of establishing corporate governance in these, and some other, countries [Jensen 
and et all (1976)]. Yeganeh and Kheirollahi (2008) found that Corporate governance compels a sort of constraint 
onmajor shareholders and facilitates access of minor shareholders, whileestablishing managerial control. It also 
leads to greater transparency in information disclosure and more advantageous observation of equity. The 
concept of transparency is hard to measure, yet is measured by accurate information received and their 
quality.Corporate governance decreases risks of financial crisis. This gains importance when such risks cause 
high expenses. It also decreases costs of investment and, consequently, increases corporate value. On the one 
hand, corporate value is a function of profitability of investments in the company. Thus, in order to maximize 
wealth of investors, managers need to identify factors affecting level of investment and make expectations of 
investors meet investment opportunities. This way, they can both boost investment opportunities and achieve 
satisfaction of investors [Fazary,A(2000)]. On the other hand, investors are considered to be essential elements 
of capital market. Investors are primarily concerned withoperating their capital to maximize and profitability and 
returns. In order to motivate investors to invest in financial assets, returns on these assets should be higher than 
other options [Bahramfar, Mehrani(2005)]. The value created for owners may come as a result of different 
factors. Here, Investigate of the Relationship comprises  independent directors, ownership concentration, 
institutional ownership, auditor type and free floating shares with firm value  in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
 
2.Theoretical basis of study 
2.1..Roles of Independent Directors on corporate value 
Level of independence of board of directors is a factor that promotes board efficiency. A great deal of studies on 
accounting have used rate of independent directors to total number of board members to quantify this 
measurement. Members of board of directors are experts at decision-making and controlling. They have no 
executive responsibilities in the company and receive no salaries [Beasley and Salterio( 2001)]. It is confirmed in 
[Peasnell and et all(2003)] and [Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)] that the presence of non-executive members in 
board of directors has positive effects on performance and value creation in companies. ever ,In the many of 
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Accounting Research for Quantification of This index form ratio of Outside directors to the entire Board of 
Directors Is used. Outside directors Are the Certified Experts That in the control and decision-making are also 
very skilled. This persons have not Executive responsibility in the company And  not receive salaries [Beasley, 
M. and Salterio, S., 2001]. In many researches have proved that the presence of Non-executive directors in the 
board of directors has Positive effect on the company's performance and value creation[Peasnell, V., Pope, F. 
and Young, S. 2003, Rosenstein, S. and Wyatt, J.G., 1990]. 
 
2.2. Institutional Shareholders  
Major shareholders apply their authority to intervene in decisions and influence the structure of board of 
directors. Therefore, they can be considered as a source of supervision on management [Yeganeh,et all(2008)]. 
Despite many reliable theories in this regard, results of experimental research on shareholders’ composition and 
corporate performance seem to be complicated and, in some cases, contradictory. According to Bushee (1998) 
institutional owners are giant investors like banks, insurance companies, and investment companies. It is 
generally believed that the presence of institutional shareholders may lead to changes in corporate trends. This 
initiates from supervisory activities of these investors (Velury& Jenkins, 2006). Maug (1998) concluded 
thatinvestors’ abilities to control management and corporate performance are functions of their level of 
investment. The higher the level of institutional ownership, the better supervision on management; and this is a 
direct relationship. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that the presence of major institutional investors, as one of 
the Corporate governance mechanisms, And due to increase of effective supervision, will have a positive effect 
on firm value. By far, the ratio of number of shares attributed to institutional owners to total number of common 
shares has been used for quantifying this measurement.  
 
2.3. Ownership Concentration 
Disjunction of management and ownership is not the root cause of the concept of agency and its consequent 
costs for investors and managers. Distribution of ownership is another influential factor in this regard. Roye 
(1990) states that, in highly distributed concentration of ownership, minor investors have no incentive to 
supervise corporate activities since they have to pay for its costs, while others will share its benefits without any 
payments. Empirical research is abundant with different approaches for ownership concentration; for example, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) define ownership concentration as a sum of shares held by 5 or 20 major shareholders. 
Rock et al. (1989)suggest that ownership concentration is possession of 5% major shares . In the present study, 
the sum of shares held by major shareholders, who are not going to sell their shares in the near future, is taken as 
the measure for ownership concentration. Jensen and Mac Ling (1976) believed that ownership concentration is 
reduced representation issues and this will improve the company's performance and value. Researchers justified 
this factor that increase the concentration of ownership will be caused that Major investors enter to the 
company's ownership structure. this investors have  incentive and enough power for supervise managers, Their 
supervise Will be make The managers take steps toward long-term goals of firm[Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. 
 
2.4. Free Floating Shares 
Free floating shares refer to shares that are expected to be traded in near future. Morgan Stanley Institute defines 
free floating shares as tradable entities in the market which are not held by institutional shareholders for 
managerial purposes. Therefore, free floating shares are total outstanding shares subtracting shares held by 
institutional shareholders. Here, subtraction of ownership concentration-1 is used for calculating free floating 
shares. In this study, free float of shares is number of shares that belongs to the minor shareholders, In other 
words, the free float shares is the percentage of the company Capital that for Market transaction is available to 
investors. 
 
2.5. Role of auditing authority on value creation 
One major assumption in agency theory is that employers find it difficult to confirm employee functionalities. 
Independent auditing is an effective and significant way to compromise interests of managers and shareholders. 
On the other hand, auditing credit and reputation has significant effects on reliability of accounting information 
and data. In theory, auditing firm size directly influences its reputation and credit. Francis & Simon (1987), Dee 
(1993) and Jonathan et all (1997) showed that big auditing firms provide qualified audit services, compared to 
small firms . In the present study, 0 is set for auditing services provided by private sector, while 1 is set for those 
provided by public sector ( iran auditing organization,2014). 
 
3.Firm Value 
In the recent years, great attention has been devoted to the issue of corporate value in the form of shareholder 
wealth (Rapaparit, 1986;Capland, 1994; Jensen, 2000), stakeholder value (Friman, 1984), customer value (Morfi 
et al., 1996), business ethics (Vallskoz, 1998; Fort, 2001), social rsponsibilities of companies (Karol, 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.3, 2015 
 
52 
1999),environmental conservation (Tsidle, 1993; Ten Bronsil et al., 2000) and civil rights (Ulino, 1999). It is 
generally accepted that corporate value develops based on moral values and standards of managers and the staff. 
If we assume company as a virtual structure, it is true to say that corporate value stems from values and priorities 
of stakeholders. That is to say, the value of a business unit is created when stakeholder values are 
internalized.Determining corporate value is an essential factor in investment (Thomason, 2004). Corporate value 
is the weight of objectives and goals from the viewpoint of decision-makers. These objectives may include 
profitability, stock return of business unit, customer value (customer satisfaction), and job-satisfaction among the 
staff, providers’ satisfaction, and appropriate social performance. After all, corporate value is market value of 
equity obtained from number of shares multiplied at price per share at the end of fiscal year [Nikoumaram, H; 
BadavarNahandi, Y (2009)]. Separation of ownership from management, together with development of agency 
theory, emphasizedthe importance of evaluating performance of managers as an essential issue in accounting, 
particularly management accounting. In this regard, many different measures and approaches have been 
proposed, such as Tobin-Q [Noravesh, I; Hoseini, A (2009)]. In 1969, James Tobin used the ratio of market 
value to book value of investment to examine investment projects. This is known as Tobin-Q ratio. He claimed 
that corporate performance could be measured by this ratio, and aimed at establishing a causal relationship 
between Q and investment level of company. If the measured ratio exceeds 1, it is concluded that the company is 
highly inspired to invest since returns of investment is greater than costs of capital. Otherwise, if the ratio is 
smaller than 1, it is concluded that the company is not working favorably and investment will be abolished in it. 
Tobin’s Q ratio is studied broadly by many researchers; William Brainard (1997), Lidenberg and Ross (1981), 
Salinger (1984), Birger and Cynthia (1988), Perfect (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Leewillen and Bandernat 
(1977), Darell. E. Lee and Tompking (1999), Demstz and Villalonga (2000). Tobin-Q ratio is a combined 
measure based on accounting and market information. Many researchers suggest it as the best optimal measure 
for evaluating performance and corporate value [Leewillen,w.g and s.gbadernat ,(1997)]. Higher ratio indicates 
higher corporate value in the market. In simple words, the more accepted corporate value for shareholders, the 
greater is the price of share and corporate value. On the contrary, a company with low performance known for 
shareholders experiences decline in Tobin-Q and corporate value [Salehi, A (2001)]. Tobin-Q is calculated as 
market value of assets divided by total price of their replacement [Thomas O’Connor,(2012)]. It is used here as 
the measure for evaluating corporate value. 
 
4.Literature Review 
Ohlson (1995) found that corporate value is a function of book value, earnings and other related data. 
Dichow (1997) states that unpredictability of changes in a variable is the measure for evaluating 
relevancy of that variable to corporate value. Thus, high level of unpredictability of a variable indicates its 
relevancy to corporate value and makes it an optimal measure for investigating relevancy since corporate value 
is created through information, and new information can changes corporate value. 
Shleifer&Vishny (1997) found in their study that big institutional investors as a corporate governance 
mechanism positively affects corporate value. 
Bushee&Noe (2000) argued that short-term investment institutes tend to invest in companies with 
greater quality of disclosure. In addition, they found that higher quality of disclosure (timelines and reliability) 
have negative effects on stock returns in the future (reduced variability). That is because higher level of 
disclosure attracts long-term investors. 
Kato et al. (2007) demonstrated that cash flow, Tobin-Q rate, earnings growth, dividends, declared 
dividend, and changes in capital influence investment level. Their results indicated a significant relationship 
between changes in dividends and past, present and future earnings. 
Wolf (2008) introduced Tobin-Q as the best and strongest existing index for evaluating and predicting 
corporate performance. 
Yung (2004) concluded in his study that improving the quality of corporate governance has positive 
effects on financial performance and corporate value. It also ensures external investors to trust financial 
statements of companies. 
Chiang(2009) used S&P measures of transparency to estimate level of financial information 
transparency and found a direct relationship between financial transparency and executive performance. He also 
found a positive and direct relationship between corporate governance and performance. Interestingly,improving 
management system leads to promotion of corporate performance and value. Therefore, supervisors can trust 
information disclosed by managers and adopt them in their decisions. 
Bauer et al. (2010) studied effects of corporate governance mechanisms on stock returns and showed 
that companies with better structure of governance enjoy higher level of corporate value and higher returns, 
compared to companies with poor structure. 
Wiu&Chieen (2013) realized that increase in liquidity leads to enhance corporate governance and, 
consequently, firm value. 
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Salehi (2009) studied correlation between Q and Lidenberg models and confirmed their correlation at 
confidence level of 99% in evaluating corporate value . 
Yahyazadeh et al. (2010) found in their study that book value has increasing role in determining 
corporate value. Book value per share is used as key factor in determining corporate value in a wide range of 
studies. In fact, users of earnings per share pay more attention to book value of shares in determining corporate 
value . 
Haghshenas (2011) found that Tobin-Q helps investors in recognizing attractive markets. It also helps 
managers to develop corporate capacity through increasing investment or buying existing assets in the market . 
Qanbari (2012) evaluated the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance. 
Results of his study indicated that rate of independent directors has no effects on performance. Also, internal 
audit has a positive and direct relationship with performance, while institutional investors have positive effect on 
performance. 
Yeganeh&Moradi (2013) demonstrated a direct relationship between institutional investors and 
corporate value. According to the authors, institutional investors effectively supervise the company and actively 
manage their portfolio and persuade managers to take optimal decisions. As a result, they contribute to promote 
corporate value and performance. 
 
5.Hypotheses 
The present study investigates the Relationship independent directors, ownership concentration, institutional 
ownership, auditor type and free floating shares with firm value  in Tehran Stock Exchange. To do this, the 
following hypotheses are projected: 
1. There is a significant relationship Between the percentage of independent directors and firm value. 
2. There is a significant relationship Between the ownership concentration and firm value. 
3. There is a significant relationship Between the institutional ownership and firm value. 
4. There is a significant relationship Between the auditor type and firm value. 
5. There is a significant relationship Between the free floating shares and firm value. 
 
6.Methodology 
The present study is an applied research using correlative post-event methodology. 
 
7.Population, sampling and duration 
Population of the study includes all companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange. Data are collected from 2006 to 
2014. A screening method is used for sampling companies satisfying the following criteria: 
1. Companies with available information from 2006 to 2014. 
2. Companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange in 2006, remaining active up to 2014. 
3. Companies whose fiscal year ends in Esfand (March). 
4. Companies which are not considered as financial, investment, holding or mediatory 
Considering the above criteria, 200 companies were selected. 
 
8.Variables 
8.1.Independent variables  
Independent variables of research include independent directors, ownership concentration, institutional 
ownership, auditor type and free floating shares,That method of calculation is as follows: 
 
Table1:   independent directors, ownership concentration, institutional ownership, auditor type and free 
floating shares 
Variable Operational Definition 
Independent directors (ID) It is calculated as number of ID divided by total number of board 
members. 
Ownership concentration(OC) 
 
Shares of major shareholders, who are not supposed to sell their shares 
in the near future, are considered as the level of ownership 
concentration. 
Institutional ownership (IO) It is calculated as shares of institutional owners divided by total 
number of common stock at the end of the period. 
Audit type (AT) If financial statements are audited by a governmental agent (Auditing 
Organization), it is considered to be 1; otherwise, it is taken to be zero. 
Free float (FF) subtraction of ownership concentration-1 is used for calculating free 
floating shares. 
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8.2. Firm Value 
Firm value is set as our dependent variable. Here, Tobin-Q is used for determining corporate value. It is 
calculated as: 
 
 
8.3.Control Variables 
Firm size, leverage and growth opportunities are used as control variables in the study, which are calculated as 
follows: 
1.Firm size: it is calculated as natural logarithm of total assets at the end of each year (T): 
 
Sizeit= firm size at the end of year t 
TAit= total assets of company i in the year t 
2. Leverage 
It is calculated as: 
 
= leverage of company i at the end of year t 
 
=liabilitiesof company i at the end of year t 
= assetsof company i at the end of year t 
3.Growth opportunity 
It is calculated as the difference of sales of previous and current year divided by sales of the previous year: 
  
Where: 
 
=sales of company i at the end of year t 
=sales of company i at the end of year t-1 
 
9.Findings                                                                                                                                                     
9.1.Statistics description of variables 
Results of descriptive analysis of data are presented in Tables 2. 
 
variables  
                 
Criteria 
ID
 
O
C
 
IO
 
A
T 
FF
 
SI
ZE
 
LE
V
 
SG
 
(Q
to
bi
n
 
) F
ir
m
 
v
a
lu
e 
N 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 
Mean 62/0  68/0  45/0  36/0  23/0  93/26  1/0  13/0  33/1  
Standard deviation 2/0  19/0  18/0  48/0  13/0  4/1  11/0  35/0  05/2  
min 2/0  07/0  03/0  0 05/0  61/23  001/0  78/0-  03/0  
max 1 1 99/0  1 7/0  01/32  92/0  59/2  19/22  
Coefficient of 
changes 
32/0  28/0  4/0  33/1  57/0  05/0  1/1  69/2  54/1  
 
9.2. Analysis normal distribution of variables at the companies level 
Analysis normal distribution of variables at the companies level in the During the period of the study are 
presented in Table 3. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results show that in the during this period, none of the variables 
were not normally distributed ,because amount of probability Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic For all variables is 
less than 5%. Due to the lack of normal variables, For the determine the correlation between the variables in this 
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period listed should be non-parametric statistics such as Spearman correlation coefficient Be used. 
 
Table 3: Test of normality of research variables at the companies level 
 
Variables       
                   
  Criteria 
ID
 
O
C
 
IO
 
A
T 
FF
 
SI
ZE
 
LE
V
 
SG
 
(Q
to
bi
n
 
) F
ir
m
 
v
a
lu
e
N 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 
K-S statistic 855/5  715/3  023/3  929/11  550/5  825/1  026/6  121/3  620/7  
K-S statistic 
probability 
000/0  000/0  000/0  000/0  000/0  003/0  000/0  000/0  000/0  
 
 
9.3.Spearman correlations between variables at the companies level 
Table 4:Spearman correlations between variables at the companies level 
  
Variables            
 
 
 
                                      
Variables 
ID
 
O
C
 
IO
 
A
T 
FF
 
SI
ZE
 
LE
V
 
SG
 
(Q
to
bi
n
 
) F
ir
m
 
v
a
lu
 
ID level of 
Correlation 
1 011/0-  
754/0  
004/0-  
903/0  
025/0  
475/0  
007/0  
847/0  
007/0  
840/0  
148/0-  
000/0  
051/0  
140/0  
201/0  
000/0  
Sig. 
OC level of 
Correlation 
 1 766/0  
000/0  
095/0-  
006/0  
576/0  
000/0  
046/0  
184/0  
032/0-  
364/0  
017/0  
617/0  
016/0-  
654/0  
Sig. 
IO level of 
Correlation 
  1 077/0-  
027/0  
228/0-  
000/0  
074/0  
034/0  
100/0-  
004/0  
054/0  
118/0  
097/0-  
005/0  
Sig. 
AT level of 
Correlation 
   1 046/0  
181/0  
005/0-  
896/0  
029/0-  
407/0  
058/0  
096/0  
082/0-  
019/0  
Sig. 
FF level of 
Correlation 
    1 001/0  
999/0  
043/0-  
220/0  
018/0-  
599/0  
075/0-  
030/0  
Sig. 
SIZE level of 
Correlation 
     1 097/0-  
005/0  
049/0  
159/0  
155/0-  
000/0  
Sig. 
LEV level of 
Correlation 
      1 061/0-  
076/0  
087/0  
012/0  
Sig. 
SG level of 
Correlation 
       1 064/0  
064/0  
Sig. 
Firm value 
(Qtobin) 
level of 
Correlation 
        1 
Sig. 
The results of the correlation between the research variables Shows a There are positive correlation and 
significant ( 0 /201) The percentage of independent board of directors and firm value. 
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9.4.Results of testing hypotheses 
H1= There is a significant relationship Between the percentage of independent directors and firm value. 
MODEL1:   Tobin’sq
it
= β
0
 + β
1
 ID
it
  + β
2
 SIZE
it 
+ β
3
LEV
it
+ β
4
SG
it
+εt 
Table 5:Results of testing hypothesis 1 
 Criteria  
                            Variables 
Regression 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t Sig. t 
Cfixed value 565/9  - 144/7  000/0  
ID  635/0  061/0  794/1  073/0  
SIZE  330/0-  225/0-  684/6-  000/0  
LEV  553/2  141/0  124/4  000/0  
SG  075/0  013/0  381/0  703/0  
R2 Adj. R2 F Sig. F DW 
067/0  063/0  883/14  000/0  864/1  
 Due to the absence of significant correlation between the percentage of independent of board of 
directors and firm value. At the level of the total companies at 95%, the First research hypothesis is not 
confirmed.  
H2=There is a significant relationship Between the ownership concentration and firm value. 
MODEL2: Tobin’sq
it
= β
0
 +β
1
OC
it
 + β
2
SIZE
it 
+ β
3
 LEV
it
+ β
4
 SG
it
+εt 
 
Table 6:Results of testing hypothesis 2 
Criteria  
 
Variables 
Regression 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t Sig. t 
Cfixed value 525/9  - 156/7  000/0  
OC     952/0  089/0  654/2  008/0  
SIZE     338/0-  230/0-  835/6-  000/0  
LEV     430/2  134/0  996/3  000/0  
SG     085/0  015/0  434/0  664/0  
R2 Adj. R2 F Sig. F DW 
071/0  067/0  904/15  000/0  552/1  
Due to the  significant correlation between ownership concentration and firm value  At the level of the 
total companies at 95%, the second  research hypothesis is confirmed. 
H3=There is a significant relationship Between the institutional ownership and firm value. 
Model3:Tobin’sq
it
= β
0
 + β
1
IO
it
+ β
2
 SIZE
it 
+ β
3
 LEV
it
+ β
4
 SG
it
+εt 
Table 7:Results of testing hypothesis 3 
Criteria 
 
Variables 
Regression 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t Sig. t 
Cfixed value 709/9  - 322/7  000/0  
IO     015/1  090/0  643/2  008/0  
SIZE     338/0-  230/0-  836/6-  000/0  
LEV     575/2  142/0  198/4  000/0  
SG     079/0  014/0  404/0  686/0  
R2 Adj. R2 F Sig. F DW 
071/0  067/0  888/15  000/0  566/1  
Due to the  significant correlation between institutional ownership and firm value  At the level of the 
total companies at 95%, the third research hypothesis is confirmed. 
H4:There is a significant relationship Between the auditor type and firm value. 
Model4:Tobin’sq
it
= β
0
 + β
1
AT
it
+ β
2
 SIZE
it 
+ β
3
 LEV
it
+ β
4
 SG
it
+εt 
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Table 8:Results of testing hypothesis 4 
Criteria 
                             Variables 
Regression 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t Sig. t 
Cfixed value 940/9  - 486/7  000/0  
AT  267/0-  063/0-  856/1-  064/0  
SIZE  325/0-  222/0-  589/6-  000/0  
LEV  299/2  127/0  770/3  000/0  
SG  105/0  018/0  537/0  592/0  
R2 Adj. R2 F Sig. F DW 
067/0  063/0  943/14  000/0  522/1  
Due to the absence of significant correlation between the auditor type and firm value at the level of the total 
companies at 95%, the fourth research hypothesis is not confirmed. 
H5:There is a significant relationship Between the free floating shares and firm value. 
Model5:Tobin’sq
it
= β
0
 + β
1
FF
it
+ β
2
 SIZE
it 
+ β
3
 LEV
it
+ β
4
 SG
it
+εt 
 
Table 9:Results of testing hypothesis 5 
Criteria 
 
Variables 
Regression 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t Sig. t 
C     251/10  - 689/7  000/0  
FF       343/1-  085/0-  524/2-  012/0  
SIZE     328/0-  224/0-  673/6-  000/0  
LEV     259/2  125/0  710/3  000/0  
SG     083/0  014/0  424/0  672/0  
R2 Adj. R2 F Sig. F DW 
071/0  066/0  725/15  000/0  523/1  
Due to the  significant correlation between the free floating shares and firm value  At the level of the 
total companies at 95%, the fifth  research hypothesis is confirmed. 
Results of testing hypotheses indicate that significance level of F-statistics is smaller than accepted 
error level (5%). Therefore, the regression model is significant. Durbin-Watson lies within the range of 1.5 to 
2.5, implying no correlation between elements of error in the model. 
 
9.Conclusion 
According to the first hypothesis can be concluded that Since the level of firms, Percentage of The Board of 
Directors no relationship with firm value, But Spearman correlation has confirmed coefficient Significant 
correlation between the percentage of The Board of Directors and firm value. Therefore can be concluded that in 
such companies Changes of the outside of the board of directors and firm value partly has been same time, But 
changes  of firm value  Has been 
Independent of changes Percentage of Independent  the board of directors And these changes in 
members of Independent  not be considered as a relevant information And on increase in stock prices and the 
resulting increase in firm value from the perspective of investors in the capital market is ineffective. This results 
in about lack of correlation between the percentage of The Board of Directors with firm value is agrees with the 
theory proposed by Barreto et al (2000)  and navysy and naykr (2006) and  is inconsistent with the 
findings from studies conducted by Bayer et al (2009), he and Chen (2011). 
According to the second hypothesis can be concluded that Since the level of firms,ownership 
concentration with firm value has a significant positive correlation and Spearman correlation has confirmed 
coefficient Significant correlation between Ownership concentration and firm value, therefore can be concluded 
that in such companies that the ownership is  more focused ,firm value is more based on the criteria Qtobins. 
Therefore can be concluded that in such companies Increasing ownership concentration as a relevant information 
And on increase in stock prices and the resulting increase in firm value from the perspective of investors in the 
capital market is effective. This results in about significant positive correlation ownership concentration with 
firm value is agrees with the theory proposed by Yang (2004) and Chiang (2005)and navysy and naykr (2006) 
and is inconsistent with the findings from studies conducted by Navysy and Naykr (2006) and feeli (2007). 
According to the Third hypothesis can be concluded that Since the level of firms, institutional 
ownership with firm value has a significant positive correlation and Spearman correlation has confirmed 
coefficient Significant correlation between institutional ownership and firm value, therefore can be concluded 
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that in such companies that institutional owners is  more ,firm value is more based on the criteria Qtobins. 
Therefore can be concluded that in such companies Increasing institutional ownership as a relevant information 
And on increase in stock prices and the resulting increase in firm value from the perspective of investors in the 
capital market is effective. This results in about significant positive correlation ownership concentration with 
firm value is agrees with the theory proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and is inconsistent with the 
findings from studies conducted by Barreto et al (2000). 
According to the fourth  hypothesis can be concluded that Since the level of firms, auditor type have not 
relationship with firm value and Spearman correlation has confirmed significant negative correlation between 
auditor type and firm value, therefore can be concluded that in such companies, changes in the auditor type of 
auditing institutions to the Auditing Organization And reduce of  the firm value Partly has been Same time ,But 
changes in the firm value has been  independent of the Changes auditor type and this changes not be considered 
as a relevant information And on increase in stock prices and the resulting increase in firm value from the 
perspective of investors in the capital market is ineffective. This results in about lack of correlation between , 
auditor with with firm value is agrees with the theory proposed by Barreto et al (2000) and Navysy and Naykr 
(2006) and is inconsistent with the findings from studies conducted by Bayer and et al (2009), wi and Chen 
(2011). 
According to the Fifth hypothesis can be concluded that Since the level of firms, free floating shares 
have a relationship negative with firm value and Spearman correlation has confirmed significant negative 
correlation between , free floating shares and firm value, therefore can be concluded that in such companies that 
have more free floating shares, firm value is more based on the criteria Qtobins. Therefore can be concluded that 
in such companies Increasing free floating shares as a relevant information And on increase in stock prices and 
the resulting increase in firm value from the perspective of investors in the capital market is effective. This 
results in about significant negative correlation free floating shares with firm value is agrees with the theory 
proposed by aksa (2006) and Dittmar and Smith (2007) and is inconsistent with the findings from studies 
conducted by Yang (2004), Verdi (2006) and Chiang (2010). 
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